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Abstract. We describe two new techniques of side-channel cryptanal-
ysis which we call the impossible collision attack and the multiset colli-
sion attack. These are inspired by the state-of-the-art cryptanalytic tech-
niques of impossible diﬀerential attacks [BBS99] and partial-function col-
lision attacks [GM00] respectively. Using these techniques on an example
of the AES we show that one has to mask all the rounds of a 128-bit key
AES in order to prevent such attacks. For example these attacks can be
used to break a recent proposal by Schramm et al. [SP06] of high order
masking for the AES, since it protects only 3 external rounds.
1 Introduction
This paper was motivated by a recent work by Handschuh-Preneel [HP06] in
which they have shown how to break through 4 rounds of DES masked with
unique masking method [AG03] using diﬀerential cryptanalysis. Another mo-
tivation comes from the fact that masking methods like [AG03] or algebraic
masking bring a high toll on the performance of the underlying cryptographic
algorithm (either in terms of high memory requirements for tables, or in terms
of slowdown for table-recalculation or complicated algebraic masking). Thus it
is a natural question for the designer: how many rounds of a cipher need to be
masked so that side-channel leakage from internal unmasked rounds becomes
useless to the attacker. For example in the case of the AES one may think that
masking two rounds at the top and at the bottom would be enough, since two
rounds of this cipher have complete diﬀusion (i.e. each output bit is inﬂuenced
by all the input bits). A prudent implementation would add an extra round for
the safety-margin, and in fact one such proposal which masks three rounds from
each end of the cipher has been proposed recently [SP06].
In this paper we describe two new tools for side-channel cryptanalysis, namely
the impossible collision attack and the multiset collision attack. As one may
infer from their names these are variations of the collision side-channel at-
tack [SLFP04, LMV04] and are inspired by the state-of-the-art techniques of
block-cipher cryptanalysis such as impossible diﬀerential attacks [BBS99] and
partial-function collisions attacks [GM00] respectively. In all our attacks we use
a standard collision attack assumption that the attacker can detect identical
calculations being performed in diﬀerent executions from similarity of the power
consumption patterns of these executions.
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Before we describe the new techniques we show a very eﬃcient collision attack
which needs only 70-80 measurements in order to break AES implementations
with perfect masking of two top and bottom rounds. This attack is surprisingly
eﬃcient if one compares it with the other advanced collision attacks on unmasked
implementations of the AES that require about 40 measurements.
Then we show how to attack AES with three round perfect masking (ex. the
one from [SP06]) using impossible collision attack. This attack requires 219−220
measurements and 227 oﬄine curve comparisons for a full key recovery. The
main idea is to detect an absence of collisions, which leaks information about
the propagation of diﬀerentials inside the cipher. Such information in its turn is
very useful in order to ﬁlter out the wrong key guesses.
Finally we show attacks using the multiset collisions techniques on three and
four rounds of masking. The distinguisher for three rounds of masking has com-
plexity of about 218 measurements. The attack on the four rounds is probably
of theoretical interest only since it requires 227 − 228 measurements and 250 of-
ﬂine computation steps, but it would be feasible for a determined attacker. The
beneﬁt of the multiset approach over the impossible collisions is that detection
of collisions in sets is much more robust to errors than detection of single byte
collisions/diﬀerences.
These results show that in the case of 128-bit key AES all the rounds have to
be masked for high security level, for 192-bit key AES 10 out of 12 rounds have
to be masked and for 256-bit 10 out of 14 have to be masked. For a medium level
of security 8 rounds of masking in total seem to be a minimum. Complexities of
our attacks (in terms of required measurements and oﬀ-line computations) are
presented in Table 1.
This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we give a brief overview of
the side-channel attacks and countermeasures. In Section 3 we describe a gen-
eral framework for the collision side-channel attacks. In Section 4 we describe a
simple collision attack on 2-rounds of masking and then we present an impossi-
ble collision attack on 3 rounds of masking. In Section 5 we present a multiset
collision attack based on Gilbert-Minier distinguisher for AES. In Section 7 we
give our conclusions.
2 Brief Overview of Side-Channel Attacks and
Countermeasures
Power attacks are based on measuring the power consumption of a device which
performs some computations with the secret values, which the attacker tries to
ﬁnd. Whenever the internal value depends on the secret key the measurement
may leak information about it. Although diﬀerent leakage models were proposed
[Mes00, BCO04, SSI05] the one that is based on the Hamming weight of the com-
puted data is the most widely used. One may assume that the power consumption
at any given moment is a normally distributed random variable with a mean de-
pending on the Hamming weight of the processed data. This assumption is the
basis of a technique called diﬀerential power analysis (DPA) [KJJ99, Mes00].
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Further research has shown that some devices may leak more than a Hamming
weight. More precisely, it is sometimes possible to determine whether a computed
byte is the same in two diﬀerent measurements. This attack uses partial internal
collisions and thus it is called a collision attack [SWP03, SLFP04, LMV04].
The main idea is to encrypt/sign/hash diﬀerent plaintexts and look for pairs
with colliding bytes. If, say, in the AES, there is a partial collision after Mix-
Columns transformation then by detecting the collision we obtain information
about a subkey of this round. The number of collisions needed for the attack
depends on the structure of the set of plaintexts. Schramm et al. in their attack
on the AES managed to recover the full key after only 40 measurements (com-
pared to thousands in some DPA attacks). On the other hand they assumed
that an attacker has perfect ability to detect collisions, i. e., they assumed that
probability of errors in collision detection is zero.
Side-channel techniques described above work only with deterministic im-
plementation by default. Any randomization added to the implementation may
defeat these methods. Let us imagine that all internal values are masked by some
previously computed random values, which will be removed before the ﬁnal step.
Then any leakage gives us information about a masked value but not about the
real one. Formally, we still know nothing about the processed values.
If masking is not completely random (say, inputs of all S-boxes of a round are
masked by the same mask), which is sometimes the case, then one becomes able
to obtain information about internal values [KJJ99, GT02, ABG04, WW04]
via higher order DPA attacks. Furthermore, the implementation of uniformly
random independent masking for all the rounds and each S-box in a round is in
most cases too expensive.
In the case of the AES several mathematical as well as engineering masking
methods were proposed. One of the most eﬃcient methods [OMPR05] is based
on the algebraic representation of an AES S-box. The S-box function, which is
usually described as a function on GF (256), may be interpreted as a function
on GF (16) × GF (16). This is called ”using composite ﬁelds” while the mask-
ing method is known as ”algebraic masking”. The inversion operation, which is
the crucial point of the S-box transformation, can be implemented much more
eﬃciently whenever we deal with smaller ﬁelds.
The complexity of many masking methods is prohibitively expensive either
in terms of required memory or in terms of slowdown eﬀect compared to the
unmasked version or both. A thorough research on this topic may be found in
Schramm’s PhD thesis [Sch06]. We just cite that the implementation of alge-
braic masking method would require either 50 times as many computations as
unmasked AES requires or about 64KB ROM for saving precomputed masked
tables. The latter method is not completely suitable because these tables should
be recomputed quite often; otherwise this will lead to successful higher order
DPA.
It is also pointed out [Sch06] that the best trade-oﬀ between the amount of
memory and the number of operations is to compute the masked table on the ﬂy
whenever it is needed. Nevertheless, masking all the rounds of the AES is still
198 A. Biryukov and D. Khovratovich
too costly, which is the reason to mask only a few ﬁrst and a few last rounds.
In the high-order resistant AES implementation by Schramm and Paar only the
ﬁrst three and the last three rounds are masked [SP06].
3 General Framework of Collision Attacks
Overall. Let f be an arbitrary non-injective function. Then a pair of diﬀerent
inputs a and b such that f(a) = f(b) (i.e. a pair that provides non-injectiveness)
is called a collision for f .
Although the notion of collision in cryptography is most often related to the
design of hash-functions, it has been recently used to describe a speciﬁc class
of side-channel attacks. In addition to being quite diﬀerent from the DPA-style
attacks, this class of attacks beneﬁts from the usage of the birthday paradox.
More precisely, let V be an intermediate variable of an algorithm A imple-
mented in a device:
V = f(P,K),
where P is an input of A and K is a secret parameter. Let us also assume that
information about V leaks via the measurement of power consumption. Say, it
is easy to detect the case
f(P1,K) = f(P2,K), (1)
which is exactly a collision for f .
As soon as an adversary detects such collisions he obtains information about
K. This fact may be easily described in the language of probability theory.
At ﬁrst collision attacks were proposed for the DES [SWP03], where one could
use non-injectiveness of the S-boxes. Then they were extended to the AES and
other ciphers [SLFP04, LMV04, HP06]. In the AES, the non-injectiveness of
MixColumns subfunctions is used. More precisely, each output byte of a round
is a function of four input bytes. Evidently, there exist collisions even if only two
input bytes are varied and two others are kept constant.
Detecting the diﬀerence. As soon as we are able to detect equality of values and
thus collisions of type (1), we are likely to detect the inequality as well. Detec-
tion of impossibility of a collision in a certain byte resembles the cryptanalytic
technique called “cryptanalysis with impossible diﬀerentials” [BBS99].
As only one of every 28 byte pairs collide, we expect to detect diﬀerences
much more often than collisions. We will show in Section 4.2 and Appendix that
mistaking diﬀerences for collisions might greatly reduce the probability of the
attack to succeed.
Accuracy of the method. Schramm et al. in their attack on the AES [SLFP04] as-
sumed perfect collisions detection. We expect that it is often not the case in the
real world so in our attacks we allow some errors of both types (false positives and
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false negatives) to occur. Evidently, the number of measurements and the success
of the attack depends on probabilities of these errors. We provide mathematical
background on these issues in the Appendix and obtain formulas for the number
of measurements and amount of data as the functions of the errors.
In order to eliminate the noise and thus reduce the probability of errors a
standard approach would be to use averaging (by repeating the same measure-
ment several times). The eﬀect of variation in clock speed can be mitigated since
it is often possible to distinguish rounds and even locate the moments of S-box
computations. Furthermore we can compare several power consumption curves
and ﬁnd the best match using the FFT technique [WW04].
4 Impossible Collision Attack
In this section we show attacks on AES with two and three rounds of masking.
We do not care which masking method is used in these rounds, we assume that
it is perfect and no information is leaked from these rounds. We assume that the
remaining inner rounds are unprotected, i.e. there are no software countermea-
sures in these rounds (the attack is robust against hardware countermeasures,
such as random power noise (random peaks of power) or variable internal clock).
These are the same assumptions as in [HP06].
4.1 Collision Attack on AES with 2 Perfectly Protected Rounds
If one considers unique masking method (UMM) or other costly masking tech-
nique for the AES at ﬁrst sight it makes sense to mask only two top and two
bottom rounds, since the AES (unlike the DES) has complete diﬀusion after just
two rounds (i.e. change in a single bit inﬂuences all 128 bits). However in this
section we describe a very eﬃcient attack on the AES with only 2 top and 2
bottom round masking.
In this section we will perform a diﬀerential cryptanalysis [BS90] of the ﬁrst
two rounds of the AES, trying to predict diﬀerences at the input of the third
round. Our goal is to make this as eﬃcient as possible in order to minimize the
number of queries to the encryption oracle and thus to minimize the number
of measurements. As usual in diﬀerential cryptanalysis we consider only the
propagation of diﬀerences and we call an S-box active if it gets non-zero input
diﬀerence, otherwise we call an S-box passive. A pattern of diﬀerence propagation
through several rounds of a cipher is called a diﬀerential characteristic, and a
collection of characteristics with the same input and output diﬀerences, but with
unrestricted behaviour in the intermediate rounds is called a diﬀerential.
We will use a diﬀerential which starts with four active S-boxes at the 1st
round. We choose those active S-boxes to appear in positions which arrive in
one column after the ShiftRows transformation. Then with probability 2−6
four active S-boxes will collapse to three (one byte out of four getting a zero


















Fig. 1. Diﬀerentials for 3 and 2 rounds of the AES
diﬀerence). After the second round the three active bytes are expanded into 12
active bytes and there will still remain 4 passive bytes. This diﬀerential can be
schematically described as 4→ 3→ 12. We will use these bytes for the detection
of collisions. This propagation is illustrated on the right in Figure 1.
A naive implementation would require 2 · 26 measurements for 26 pairs of
text until we detect a pair which has the diﬀerential property of 4 passive bytes
(happens by chance with probability 2−32). However we can use a standard trick
from diﬀerential cryptanalysis and pack the texts into structures. The attacker
will prepare a set of 24 texts which share the same random constant in the bytes
corresponding to the passive S-boxes at the 1st round, and diﬀerent randomly
chosen values for the four active bytes. Then the attacker considers all possible
∼ 28 pairs in this set. Thus in these structures of 24 texts there will be about
four right pairs among about 256 wrong ones. If we can perfectly detect collisions
at the input of the 3rd round then we will remain only with the right pairs (if
we detect four collisions for the bytes corresponding to some column, this pair
can only be a right pair). Each right pair reduces the key-space by 8 bits, and
thus with four such pairs we know the 32-bit chunk of the key corresponding
to the four active S-boxes of the ﬁrst round. We can repeat this attack in four
other locations completely recovering the subkey of the 1st round and thus the
secret key of the AES as well. This attack needs less than 100 measurements. If
we supplement the attack with partial exhaustive search of 232 complexity the
number of measurements becomes less than 75. Interestingly this complexity is
close to the one obtained in collision attacks on unmasked AES implementations
(40 measurements).
As a result of this attack it is clear that at least 3 rounds of AES have to
be masked at both ends. It may also seem suﬃcient. Nevertheless in the next
subsection we show how to penetrate through 3 rounds of masking for AES.
However this requires a new side-channel attack technique.
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4.2 Impossible Collision Attack on 3 Rounds of AES with Masking
Now we are in a scenario when three rounds of AES are masked at the top and
at the bottom.
Let us see what happens if we use the diﬀerential as shown on the left side
of Figure 1: 4 → 1 → 4 → 16. We see that by the properties of AES diﬀusion
the four active bytes which enter the 3rd round, will be spread to four diﬀerent
columns and after application of the MixColumns all 16 bytes of the internal
state of AES will be active. That means that we are guaranteed that there will
be no collisions at the input to the 4th round. Thus it seems that we can not
use the collision detection technique anymore, since there will be no collisions.
However we can try to use precisely this property in order to build the attack.
The pairs which do not follow the diﬀerential will occasionally have collisions in
some bytes, at the input of the 4-th round. If we can reliably detect those byte
collisions we can immediately discard all such pairs, since we know that there can
be no collisions in a right pair. This idea is very similar to how wrong pairs are
ﬁltered in impossible diﬀerential cryptanalysis. Since we use not the collisions
but absence of them as a distinguisher, we call this technique an impossible
collision attack.
Probability that at least one byte out of 16 is the same (at the input of the 4th
round) in a pair of AES encryptions is 1 − (255/256)16 ≈ 1/16. This is clearly
a very weak ﬁlter, 15 out of every 16 wrong pairs will go through and thus we
need some way to amplify the ﬁltration. For each pair that is being tested we
can construct its variation, in which we keep the values that enter active S-boxes
intact, and vary only the constants that enter the passive S-boxes. After 16 such
trials the chance for a wrong pair to survive all the tests is about 0.36. We
repeat the test for the remaining pairs again and again, etc. At the end we will
be left only with the right pair which exhibits no collisions. Given a right pair
we recover 22 bits of subkey information of the 1st round similar to an attack
from the previous section. In order to use the measurements more eﬃciently we
will again pack the data into structures, but this time of size 212, each structure
providing 223 pairs and thus about two right pairs (probability of the 1st round
diﬀerential is 2−22). We will need 27–28 such structures since ﬁltration is much
slower than in the previous section.
The total complexity of this attack is as follows. We will need about 27–28
times more structures than in the previous attack, since our ﬁltration is weaker.
Thus we will need a total of 219–220 measurements. The analysis phase will have
complexity of about 16 · 223 = 227 curve comparisons.
This attack is relatively robust to the errors in which we miss collisions, since
we still will have a chance to ﬁlter such pair in next trials. However this attack
is sensitive to the errors of the second kind in which we miss the diﬀerence and
detect a collision where there is none. Such error can ﬁlter out a right pair and
thus we need to ensure that the set of pairs contains enough right pairs, so that
at least one remains after the ﬁltration process.
In the appendix we derive the formula which relates the error probability with
the total number of required pairs and the probability of the diﬀerential.
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5 Multiset Collision Attack on 4 Masked Rounds
5.1 Three Round Distinguisher
Our idea is to use an eﬃcient 3-round distinguisher1 for the AES proposed by
Gilbert and Minier in [GM00].
We use the following notation for bytes of the AES internal state:
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
a00 a01 a02 a03
a10 a11 a12 a13
a20 a21 a22 a23
a30 a31 a32 a33
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
Let us denote by y the byte a00 in the ﬁrst round input, and by C the block
of three bytes a10, a20, a30 in the same column. Now ﬁx the other bytes to any
12-tuple of constant values. Let us also denote by s the byte a00 in the input to
the fourth round. Then the following proposition holds.
Proposition 1 ([GM00]). The value of s is fully determined by a secret key K,
the byte y, the set C, and 12 ﬁxed bytes. Furthermore, its value may be expressed
as a key-dependent function of one byte-value function of y and four byte-value
functions of C:











Due to the birthday paradox, a pool of 216 distinct sets C contains triplets
C′ and C′′ such that giK(C
′) = giK(C




[y] ≡ sC′′ [y]. (3)
Gilbert and Minier also noted that much fewer than 256 diﬀerent y is usually
enough for verifying this property. For our purposes only 6 diﬀerent y’s will
suﬃce. Indeed, a wrong pair of triplets collides in one point (byte) of the function
s with probability 2−8 so 6 y’s will ﬁlter all wrong pairs, except for a fraction of
2−48.
1 It is natural to try to apply Square attack distinguisher to side-channel attacks,
however one quickly discovers that detection of a balanced property requires very
high precision from the attacker in the course of many measurements, and thus is
not robust to even small amounts of noise.
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Thus we obtain a distinguisher for three rounds of the AES that works as
follows. An adversary chooses a set of 6 · 216 ≈ 218.5 plaintexts with 216 diﬀerent
C’s and 6 y’s for each set C. Then he encrypts those texts and checks for collisions
in the input of fourth round. A right pair provides 6 collisions while on average
no wrong pair (out of 231) will survive this test. Complexity of this distinguisher
is comparable to the complexity of our impossible collision attack, however it
seems more robust, since it detects collisions rather than the absence of them
and can be easily strengthened by increasing the size of the set. This ﬂexibility
can be very useful in the presence of the countermeasures. Now we will show
how to use this distinguisher to construct an attack on the four masked rounds.
5.2 Attack
To pass through four masked rounds we add a round in the beginning. Now we
have to guess 4 bytes of the ﬁrst subkey that aﬀect y and C. We propose two
approaches to detect whether a tested subkey is the right subkey. The ﬁrst one
requires 232 measurements and 244.5 oﬄine steps. The second one requires fewer
measurements but the overall complexity is substantially higher.
Attack 1. We encrypt all the 232 plaintexts that vary only in bytes a00, a11, a22,
a33 of the ﬁrst round and save measurements. Thus before the second round we
have 232 intermediate states that vary only in the ﬁrst column. Let us denote
this set by D.
As we are able to detect collisions, we divide D by 28 distinct groups (let us
denote them in Bi, i = 1, 256) with regard to corresponding power consumption
curves. A pair of plaintexts from the same group is highly likely to collide in s.
Next for each key guess of bytes k00, k11, k22, k33 we do the following.
– Choose from D 216 distinct sets Dc = (P1, P2, . . . , P6) such that c is the
common C-triplet for Pi, and y byte is equal to i. Thus every Dc is exactly
a verifying set that we use for 3-round distinguisher with 6 diﬀerent y’s.
– For each Dc ﬁll the vector Vc = (j1, j2, . . . , j6) such that Pi ∈ Bji .
– Search for vectors Vc′ = Vc′′ . Such a pair implies a functional collision of
type (3). A right key guess will lead to at least one such pair.
Complexity 1. The ﬁrst two steps require 6 · 216 1-round AES transformations
if we do them straightforwardly. To reduce the complexity we ﬁrst decrypt the
y ◦ C columns (6 · 216 ones) using the zero subkey. Thus we obtain Dc for the
zero subkey.
To avoid the most of recomputations we arrange the set of subkeys such
that the computation of new Dc’s requires fewer operations. A good example is
provided by the Gray code [Knu04] where the next codeword diﬀers only in a
single bit. Thus we need only 6 · 216 bit ﬂips for each new subkey. The usage of
speciﬁc data structures might give us 216 byte complexity.
In the last step we have to ﬁnd a colliding pair of vectors V . We sort them
and then search for the pairs. Overall we need about 216 simple operations
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for each key guess, i.e. 248 oﬄine steps or about 243 one AES round steps to
recover the 32-bit chunk of the key. In order to complete the key recovery we
can repeat the attack for other byte positions 3 times, thus ﬁnding 96 bits of the
ﬁrst round subkey and complete the attack by 232 exhaustive search steps. Thus
the complexity of the oﬀ-line part is about 244.5 one AES round steps. For the
online part we need about 232 measurements. Due to high on-line and oﬀ-line
complexity this attack is mainly of theoretical interest, though it is on the verge
of practicality for a determined attacker.
Attack 2. Now we encrypt 229.5 (1/6th of the number of measurements used
by the previous attack) distinct plaintexts (we follow the notations for the ﬁrst
attack) that vary only in bytes a00, a11, a22, a33 of the ﬁrst round.
For each key guess of bytes k00, k11, k22, k33 we do the following.
– Choose also 216 distinct sets Dc but of diﬀerent cardinality. On average each
Dc contains m = 25.5 plaintexts. The problem is that the set of y’s depends
on a Dc. Nevertheless, we expect that for each pair c′, c′′ there are about
m2/256 = 8 common y’s.
– For each Dc = (P1, P2, . . . , Pm) ﬁll the vector
Vc =
(〈y1, j1〉, 〈y2, j2〉, . . . , 〈ym, jm〉
)
such that
• If we encrypt Pi using subkey k then the value of y-byte (input to the
second round) is yi;
• Pi ∈ Bji .
– Search for pairs such that common y’s imply common j’s. This means we
found a functional collision of type (3). A right key guess will lead to at least
one such pair.
Complexity 2. Now we estimate the number of operations for each key guess.
We use the same technique to reduce the complexity of the ﬁrst two steps. The
only diﬀerence is that we ﬁrst have to decrypt all the possible columns because
we do not know what y’s we will need further. We also have to ﬁlter this set of
216 · 28 = 224 diagonals by our predeﬁned set of plaintexts (D), since only 1/6 of
the diagonals will be present in our measurement sets. Thus the complexity for
the zero subkey is about 230 byte-operations while for the other ones we need
224 bit operations or 221 byte ones.
Unfortunately, the problem of Vc vector matching is somewhat more com-
plicated. For each value of c only about 40 plaintexts would be present in our
measurement set (i.e. we get 216 Vc vectors with 40 random entries ”turned on”
in each). Due to the birthday paradox any pair of vectors would typically have
about 6 common indexes. If all the yi’s at common locations coincide — this
is a multiset collision that we are looking for. If at least one of the coordinates
diﬀers — the pair is a wrong pair. The problem is that common index locations
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diﬀer for diﬀerent pairs. Thus a naive algorithm would be to try all possible
(216)2 = 232 pairs of vectors which would bring the total complexity of the
attack to about 264 steps.
A faster approach would be as follows: for the pair c′, c′′ which produce a
multiset collision there exist at least 6 common index locations in which the yi’s
are the same. Thus if we try about 40 index locations at random one of them will
likely be the index location in which the right pair has a common index and is
colliding. At a speciﬁc index location i only about 216/6 = 213.5 constants c will
be active (i.e. will have a corresponding measurement). We can thus distribute
the measurements in location i into 28 buckets according to the yi. Each value
will appear about 25.5 times. Only the measurements that fell in one bucket need
to be further checked for the presence of collisions at other common locations.
Here we can simply check all possible pairs in a bucket in 211 vector comparisons
which require about 8 simple operations till we get the next common location
at which in most cases there will be a c ontradiction. We have 28 buckets to
check, thus the total complexity for one key guess is 40 · 28 · 211 · 8 = 227 simple
comparisons, or 222 one AES round steps. Due to a high oﬀ-line complexity this
attack is mainly of theoretical interest.
6 Attacks on the Bottom Rounds
As soon as an adversary is allowed to decrypt ciphertexts he may perform an
attack on the bottom round of AES. Although the last round does not contain
MixColumns transformation, the number of S-box layers we pass through is
the same.
Futhermore, AES might (and is encouraged to) be implemented such that
the decryption steps are exactly the same as those of encryption. This is gained
by swapping MixColumns ↔ AddRoundKey and swapping SubBytes ↔
ShiftRows. Such an implementation is of the same security against a decrypting
adversary as well as encrypting one.
Thus all the listed attacks may be succesfully applied also to the bottom
rounds with the same complexity.
Table 1. Complexities of our attacks on partially masked AES implementations
Method Complexity Masked Attack
Measurements Oﬀ-line rounds
Simple collisions 26–27 27 2 Full key recovery
Impossible collisions 219–220 227 3 Full key recovery
MultiSet collisions 218.5 220 3 Distinguisher
MultiSet collisions 232 244.5 4 Full key recovery
MultiSet collisions 229–230 254 4 32 key bits recovery
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7 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown two new techniques of side-channel cryptanalysis
based on collision detection: an impossible collision attack and a multiset colli-
sion attack. Using these techniques we show how to break AES implementations
with 2, 3 and 4 round masking at both ends. One example of such implemen-
tation is [SP06]. This shows that in total at least 10 AES rounds out of 10, 12,
or 14 (depending on the key-size) have to be masked in order to prevent such
attacks. The overall complexities (in terms of required measurements and oﬀ-line
computations) are presented in Table 1. The oﬀ-line complexities of single and
impossible collision attacks are measured in curve comparisons while those of
the other attacks are measured in one AES round executions.
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Amount of Data as a Function of Error Probability
Let us denote by p the probability of the diﬀerential (= 2−22 in our case) and
by M the number of tested pairs. Thus we can approximate the number of right
pairs by pM . After a test about αpM good pairs and βM bad pairs survive,
where α is the probability of a right pair to survive while β is that of a wrong
pair (we will show how to estimate them later).
Now recall that we do the variation so each pair has, say, t sisters, which has
the same right/wrong property. After a test we have about αtpM good pairs and
βtM bad pairs survived. A simple suﬃcient condition for the attack to succeed





2 Note that one may not need complete elimination of the wrong pairs. As soon as the
faction of right/wrong pairs doubles we can claim that we have gained a single bit
of key information.
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Exponentiating the second expression by the logα β and dividing it to the ﬁrst







It implies simple conditions on α and β:
β < α ≤ 1, (5)
which has an obvious interpretation. There is no information gain if the inequal-
ity does not hold.
A formulae for the number of measurements (t) may be easily obtained
from (4):
t = max(log1/β M, log1/α(pM)).
Now we show how to estimate α and β a priori. Imagine we evaluated a priori
errors of detecting collisions in a single byte. We are interested in two of them:
αB — the probability of a diﬀerence in a single byte to be recognized; (6)
βB — that of a collision in a single byte to be missed. (7)
Schramm et al. in [Sch06] have the ﬁrst one to be 1 while the second one is
zero. We show how to deal with a more complicated case. Let ci of all wrong pairs
collide in i bytes (i = 1, 16). To survive, no collisions should be detected while all
diﬀerences should be recognized. Thus every wrong pair with i collisions survives






B of wrong pairs survive. This


























< α16B ⇐⇒ βB < αB.
As a result, the suﬃcient condition on the attack to succeed is the fact that
the probability of a diﬀerence in a single byte to be recognized is more than that
of a collision to be missed.
